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PWANI C KENYA? MEMORY, DOCUMENTS 
AND SECESSIONIST POLITICS IN COASTAL KENYA 
 
JUSTIN WLLIS AND GEORGE GONA* 
 
ABSTRACT 
 Following the elections of 2007, there was a significant increase in public expressions of secessionist 
feeling on the Kenya coast. The language of secessionism is historical, and revisits the vivid political 
debates of the late 1950s and early 1960s, when politics in coastal Kenya  revolved successively 
around two constitutional issues. The first was the possibility that the Ten-Mile Strip, nominally the 
sovereign territory of the Sultan of Zanzibar, might not become a part of independent Kenya; the 
second was the ‘regionalist’ constitution of 1963-64. This article explores the way that people now 
retell the history of earlier debates, and argues that these retellings suggest both the power and the 
plasticity of claims to historical knowledge, and that they reveal a profound fault line within 
‘secessionist’ opinion, which separates those who claim political primacy on the basis of autochthony 
from those who locate their claim to independence in the language of colonial-era treaties.  
 
DURING 2010 AND 2011, THE MOMBASA REPUBLICAN COUNCIL (MRC) became a 
prominent presence in the politics of coastal Kenya, articulating multiple, longstanding grievances 
and setting out a defiant agenda which poses an existential threat to the Kenyan state by demanding 
independence for the coast.
1
 Continuing disputes over land ownership; the sense that wealth and jobs 
are largely held by ‘up-country’ people; the belief that the coast is deprived of educational facilities 
and that the revenues generated by tourism all end up elsewhere; conspiracy theories about drugs and 
politicians – all come together in the meetings and leaflets (and now, on the Facebook page) which 
bear the name of the MRC -  though, as will be suggested below, the level of cohesion and 
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organization which lies behind that name may be questioned.
2
 . The t-shirts, flags and graffiti of MRC 
supporters repeat the slogan Pwani si Kenya, ‘the coast is not Kenya’ – rendered sometimes, in self-
consciously voguish text-speak, as Pwani C Kenya. In late 2011 they began to call for a boycott of 
Kenya’s next national elections; when rowdy youths disrupted a trial poll exercise in Malindi in 
March 2012, the MRC was blamed.
3
  The threat to disrupt the elections is evidently viewed as 
particularly alarming, with potentially wider consequences. Government reactions have veered 
erratically between repression, accusations that the MRC are linked to Somali militants, and uncertain 
offers of negotiation; at the time of writing (July 2012), a court ruling which overturns the 
government’s decision to ban the MRC has created further confusion.4  
Those claiming to speak for, or in support, of the MRC consistently evoke history in support of this 
claim to independence. They are particularly concerned with events in the period from the late 1950s 
to 1964, when two issues were, successively, the subject of a very public and bitter politics at the 
coast. The first (which has been the subject of recent work by James Brennan) was the status of the 
‘Ten-Mile Strip’. Running along the length of the Kenya coastline, but never properly defined or 
mapped, this was nominally the territory of the Sultan of Zanzibar.
5
 When the rest of British East 
Africa became Kenya Colony, in 1920, the Strip remained a protectorate. As Kenyan independence 
moved rapidly from being a distant possibility to an imminent reality, the uncertain legal position of 
the coast suddenly assumed new significance. When this question was apparently resolved at the end 
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of 1961, the second issue immediately arose. This related to the Coast Province as a whole – a much 
larger administrative unit, which included the ‘Ten-Mile Strip’ but stretched far inland.   
From 1962 to 1964 the politics of Kenya’s independence were dominated by the argument over 
whether each of Kenya’s provinces should become ‘regions’ at independence, with substantial 
devolved power, or whether they should continue to be no more than administrative units of a 
centralized state. These debates ended with a clear victory for the proponents of a single, centralized 
state. The Ten-Mile Strip did not become independent; and after a brief experiment with regional 
government, Kenya moved to a centralized administrative structure at the end of 1964.  
In recalling this history, those who claim to represent the MRC change or blur the details of these 
events, and draw them into arguments about legitimate authority and the  primacy of different 
communities at the coast. In studying the way that people discuss these events, this article speaks to 
two wider academic debates. One is about the power of historical representation – power over such 
representation, and the power created by it. While some of these retellings of history evidence a 
familiar theme – the malleability of remembered historical knowledge and the flexibility of oral 
history -  the centrality of written treaties suggests a rather different phenomenon. By citing such 
documents, the MRC offers a challenge to the esoteric knowledge which lies behind state authority, 
the distribution of which is profoundly inequitable, and it asserts a claim to an alternative authoritative 
knowledge of documents which can remake power – a  subversive appropriation of what Sharon 
Hutchinson, in another context, has called the ‘hidden powers of “paper”’.6 Levels of literacy on the 
Kenya coast are much higher than those in Hutchinson’s study area in southern Sudan, but here too 
words on paper are attributed a special, sometimes magical, power which may be particularly 
compelling for those who cannot read them.
7
 Even for those who can read English, the texts of these 
treaties are not easily available, and they are couched in an obscure and exclusive style. 
Reinterpreting their content, as the MRC does, turns esoteric power on its head in a way which offers 
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an alternative ‘world on paper’, and has a powerful allure for those who feel that documents embody 
what Hutchinson called a ‘simultaneous dependence on and estrangement from the powers of the 
government’.8  
 The other debate is about contending visions of legitimacy, and sets a legal sovereignty rooted in the 
alleged details of treaties against rights claimed on the basis of autochthony. The uneasy relationship 
between these two kinds of claim is evident elsewhere in Kenya, and across the continent more 
widely, where what Gabrielle Lynch has called the ‘common search for prosperity and security of 
tenure amidst underdevelopment and state failure’ has encouraged a language of indigeneity – which 
is not entirely novel, but has gained new strength in recent years. 
9
 Lotte Hughes has shown how 
recent Maasai claims to land, and to political autonomy, combine references to colonial treaties with 
the assertion of indigenous status
10
. But legal sovereignty and the claims of autochthony may instead 
be in tension. They invoke different notions of legitimacy – the Casamance separatists of Senegal 
justify their agenda through reference to colonial treaties  to ‘mask the primordial object of the claim’, 
as Mamadou Diouf has put it, and avoid accusations of tribalism.
 11
  But on Kenya’s coast, 
sovereignty and autochthony also define different, potentially rivalrous, constituencies:  the MRC has 
many voices, which speak in different ways through different media, and their differences reveal 
disharmony, as well as a shared sense of oppression. For some of these voices, the MRC is a 
movement founded based on treaties and the sovereignty which these construct, and it is ethnically 
and racially inclusive. For others, it is a movement based on autochthony, and on the exclusive claims 
of particular ethnic groups.  
Land and race 
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The treaty of 1895, which conjured legal sovereignty out of the uncertain stuff of Zanzibari influence, 
was the culmination of a series of treaties which each involved a degree of legal prestidigitation. An 
Anglo-German treaty in 1886 had defined the Sultan’s territories on the coast as a strip ten miles in 
width; in 1887 British government pressure (and fear of German ambitions) led the Sultan of Zanzibar 
to grant the Imperial British East Africa Company rights to administer, and collect tax in the strip over 
which his powers had been recognized.  An 1890 treaty placed Zanzibar itself and this strip of coast 
under British protection. When the Company proved unequal to the task of administering the coast, 
and tottered into bankruptcy, the Sultan was bullied and bribed to buy out the ‘rights’ it had been 
granted through the 1895 treaty, under which the British government took over the Company’s 
powers to administer and tax in return for an annual payment to the Sultan of £17,000: £11,000 in 
rent, and £6,000 as interest on the £200,000 which (according to a rather complicated logic) the 
Sultan had paid to the Company to surrender the lease, and was therefore deemed to have lent to the 
British government.
12
 
The agreements of 1890 and 1895 thus embodied two claims to legal sovereignty. They were the 
formal basis of British control over the Kenya coast – a crucial legitimating device in a time of 
competitive European expansion. But even more fundamentally they both asserted and limited the 
sovereignty of the Omani sultans of Zanzibar, on the basis of a political authority that was exiguous 
outside the few major urban settlements which fringed the Indian Ocean. Rooted in many hundreds of 
years of settlement from and commerce with the Gulf, the Omani presence more immediate origins in 
the nineteenth-century, when  the Oman’s ruling family  became both beneficiary and victim of 
British patronage.
13
 British protection allowed one branch of the  family, in Zanzibar, to split away 
from Oman after the death of the long-ruling Seyyid Said in 1856; and British capital, as well as 
diplomatic and military support, allowed the newly-styled sultans of Zanzibar to maintain and extend 
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their influence along the East African coast.
14
 The treaties turned this uncertain authority into an 
internationally-recognized sovereignty – but also limited it to a strip ten miles wide. 
Writing of Zanzibar itself, Jonathan Glassman has shown how a long and complex history of 
settlement and unequal commercial and political relations shaped local understandings  of  tensions 
over land, status and wealth which mapped these onto racial categories: British rule did not create 
this, but it created a context in which antagonism between Arab and African became increasingly 
bitter and violent in the late colonial period. 
15
 On the Kenya coast, too, British rule did not create 
racial thought, nor the sense of hierarchy; but the British colonial enthusiasm for racial categories did 
exacerbate difference. Legal status, taxation, the possibilities of land ownership – for most of the 
period of British rule, all were defined by race. In this context the term ‘Swahili’ -  which had been 
widely used to signify and claim membership of a distinctively coastal, largely Muslim and urban 
community that hinted at the subversion of this racial categorization – fell out of favour as a term for 
self-definition,  and indeed, became almost a term of opprobrium.
16
  At the same time, increasing 
literacy and print media offered new possibilities to debate the boundaries and prerogatives of race.  
 From the early years of British rule, land had been a particular focus for these debates. Together with 
the distinct legal status of the coast, the formal abolition of slavery produced an anomalous situation, 
ripe for friction. In contrast to other parts of Kenya, it was possible for individuals to own freehold 
land in the Ten-Mile Strip, since the British were committed to respecting the pre-existing property 
rights of the Sultan’s subjects. But only those classed as Arabs (and some Asians, who had bought 
land from Arabs) were recognized as possessing these rights; Africans could not own land.
17
 Land 
over which no claim was recognized was judged to be Crown Land. Some of this was set aside for 
African use, either as reserves or – from the 1920 – as settlement schemes; some was granted as 
leasehold to European or Asian entrepreneurs. While Asians, Arabs and Europeans were allowed to 
own land, freehold or leasehold, hardly any had the capital required to work it. Instead, land lay 
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unused, or landlords encouraged African squatters (some of them ex-slaves) to live on the land, in 
return for labour or for a share of their crop.
18
 Those who owned the land could not use it; those who 
used it could not own it – and the distinction between them was based on racial and ethnic 
categorizations.
19
  
The situation became steadily more complex over time. British officials claimed that increasing 
numbers of people who had lived just inland from the Ten-Mile Strip were moving on to vacant land 
along the coast, either to escape from food shortages or to take advantage of cash markets for produce 
– or both. Those described by the British as migrants largely belonged to the groups who were called 
Nyika at the time, and are now more often called Mijikenda: Giriama, Digo and others, who were 
considered both coastal and African.
20
 These squatters themselves insisted that they were simply 
occupying lands which had always been theirs.  By the later 1940s and 1950s, an explicitly racial 
language of antagonism between landowner and squatter was commonplace along the coast.
21
 The 
squatters were persistently on the losing side in legal terms and there were frequent evictions; but 
many landowners could not survive without squatter labour, and the state lacked the resources to 
prevent the widespread petty challenges to landowners’ property rights, which ranged from cutting 
firewood or harvesting fruit, to grazing livestock on their land or growing and harvesting annual 
crops.
22
 
Until the 1950s, the language of these challenges was little recorded; in such written accounts as exist, 
there is no mention of the 1895 agreement, though evidently Arabs were very conscious of the 
significance of the treaty, and the symbolic power of the sultan’s flag.23 But in the early 1950s, some 
Arabs and Asians on the coast, inspired by political developments in Zanzibar and uneasy over the 
prospect of political change in Kenya, had begun to argue that that the distinct legal position of the 
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Ten-Mile Strip could be used to fend off ‘African’ rule in favour of some form of autonomy.24 Over 
the next few years they used the term mwambao – a name for the coast itself - as an abbreviated 
statement of their ambitions. The adoption of this slogan conveniently glossed over a persistent 
uncertainty as to whether the aim was complete independence or some more limited autonomy. 
Enthusiasm for mwambao was characterized, as Brennan has said, by ‘opportunism ... and socio-
economic incoherence’ and multiple political parties emerged to campaign for slightly varying visions 
of this goal; the most visible of these was the Coast People’s Party (CPP).25 Divided though they 
were, all these parties shared the sense that the 1895 treaty was the basis of their campaign.
26
 
This inspired a reactive opposition to the treaty from those who considered themselves ‘African’ 
leaders, and who insisted on preeminent claims of auotchthony. Following the decision by the 
colonial government to allow district-level political organizations in 1955, several parties were 
created at the coast which – as was characteristic of the period– were explicitly racial in the way they 
defined their constituencies: : the Mombasa African District Union (MADU); the Kilifi African 
Peoples Union (KAPU) and, briefly, the Kwale African Democratic Union.
27
 All were directly 
concerned with the land issue: 
There was no foreign nation which came to Africa with cargoes of soil from their homes, so 
there is no foreign soil here on the East African coast. This is black land, and the indigenous 
people are black, from the outset, and it must remain in black hands until the end of the 
world.
28
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 These organizations were led by educated men who were enthusiastic letter-writers and producers of 
pamphlets, as well as public-speakers: race, autochthony, political primacy and claims to land were all 
bound up in their language, and they mocked the illogicality of treaty-based claims:
29
  
It is amazing to claim that one land can be ruled by two monarchs . . . we know we are ruled 
by just one monarch, and she is British, and it is she who will lead us Africans on the road to 
self-government
30
 
The leaders of KAPU and MADU saw mwambao as a device to perpetuate Arab dominance; in 1960, 
hearing that the Sultan was visiting London, they wrote urgently to the Secretary of State  insisting 
that he should not make any new agreement concerning the coast without consulting the African 
populace, who were its rightful owners.
31
 There were multiple ethnic tensions – notably relating to 
competition for urban employment – within the African population of the coast, notably between the 
Mijikenda (a term which was just coming into widespread use) and more recent arrivals from ‘up-
country’.32 But all shared a suspicion of mwambao.  
The Robertson Commission 
When, in 1961, the British government decided that the issue of the Ten-Mile Strip could best be 
formally settled by appointing a ‘Commissioner’ to inquire into the matter, the outcome of that 
inquiry was already decided. The expectation was that the Commissioner, James Robertson, would 
recommend that the coast should be part of an independent Kenya.
33
 But the opponents of mwambao 
did not know this, and what followed was a remarkable moment of political mobilization and popular 
activism.  
By this time, Ronald Ngala had emerged as the main African political leader at the coast, and as a key 
figure in the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU). KADU was one of two national parties 
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which were created in mid-1960, which were partly ethnic and regional in character – KADU was led 
by politicians from the Rift Valley, western Kenya and the coast, while the leaders of rival Kenya 
African National Union (KANU) were largely from central Kenya and Nyanza.
34
 Ngala’s dominance 
at the coast – and consequently, his role in KADU – were a consequence of his effective deployment 
of a claim to autochthony. Francis Khamisi, the other prominent African leader on the coast was the 
descendant of freed slaves, and while he was an articulate exponent of African rights against Arabs, 
he could be seen as an outsider.
35
 Ngala, on the other hand, was a Giriama - a member of one of the 
two largest constituent groups of the Mijikenda. Since 1957 he had systematically evoked the idea of 
a unified Mijikenda identity by reviving a defunct organization called the Mijikenda Union, which 
played a major role in the campaign against mwambao.
36
 As formal leader of the Union, Ngala 
enlisted Robert Matano, newly elected to Kenya’s parliament and, like Ngala, a Christian with a 
professional background in teaching and then in educational administration. Unlike KADU and other 
political parties, the Mijikenda Union remained formally a cultural organization – and its public 
pronouncements emphasized tradition and autochthony, not education or national politics.  Other 
groups also opposed coastal autonomy. KANU, KADU’s national rival, had a local presence at the 
coast, and was virulently anti-mwambao; and there was also the Coast African Political Union 
(CAPU), a largely Mijikenda party which continued the rhetorical denunciation of Arabs which had 
characterized KAPU and MADU, and was to be increasingly ambivalent in its attitude towards 
Africans who were not from the coast.
37
 
When Robertson came to the coast to gather evidence, he encountered a coordinated series of 
demonstrations and deputations, and multiple memoranda. As one delegation explained, ‘All the 
KADU, KANU and Miji Kenda people were opposed to Coastal Autonomy, and desired Kenya to 
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develop as a unitary state’.38 In both demonstrations and deputations, the Mijikenda Union became 
prominent in the campaign against mwambao, and associated with an argument about  autochthony, 
which  subtly turned the issue from one which set Arabs against Africans into a more specific claim 
by ‘the Mijikenda’ as a group to be the‘indigenous’ or ‘native’ population  – and therefore the proper 
owners – of the coast: 39  
 
Ngala told Robertson that the Mijikenda ‘want you to help them by doing away with the Coastal Strip 
agreement of 1895, which was made without their consent’.40 A ‘Mijikenda’ delegation declared that 
‘they were all Africans, united together. They did not recognize the coastal strip’; and on similar lines, 
a CAPU delegation insisted that ‘the Africans had not been consulted when the Treaty was made, and 
they demanded that it should be abolished at once’.41 As one CAPU memorandum neatly summed it 
up, the debate set the rights established by the 1895 treaty against those claimed on the grounds of 
autochthony: ‘“The immigrant races” argument is based chiefly on the treaty while ours is based on 
the principle of our very long occupation of the Coast’.42 
As part of this vigorous campaign, Robert Matano stage-managed a delegation of ‘Mijikenda elders’ 
to the Sultan of Zanzibar.
43
  That in itself was an interesting nod to history – though the press 
coverage at the time did not mention it, it was surely inspired by local memory of a delegation to 
Zanzibar by elders in 1888.
44
 Unsurprisingly, the newspaper record suggests that the delegation 
resulted in an exchange of banalities:  
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The Sultan of Zanzibar has assured a delegation of the Miji Kenda tribes from the Kenya 
Coastal Strip that he is determined to find a peaceful solution to the problem of the 
Protectorate . . . The delegation’s main purpose was to ask the Sultan to use his good offices 
to restrain the Arabs in the Protectorate and to implore them to stop their provocative 
campaign.
45
 
When members of the delegation visited the Kenya Governor on return from Zanzibar, they 
reportedly told him that they were ‘totally opposed to the idea of an autonomous state’.46 There is no 
evidence that the delegation’s visit had any effect on the attitude of the Sultan – who had by this time 
made it clear that he had no intention of supporting the secessionists.
47
 Nor, presumably, was it of 
much concern to Robertson, who had already been told privately by the Governor that ‘most thinking 
people in Nairobi and in the Government felt that autonomy for the Coast was a non-starter’.48 But it 
did assert a specifically Mijikenda claim to political primacy. 
In December 1961 Robertson duly recommended that the Ten-Mile Strip should become part of 
Kenya at independence.
49
  The formal conclusion of the process was delayed for almost two years, 
however. In October 1963, shortly before independence, the Sultan renounced his claims to 
sovereignty over the coast in a treaty between Britain and the Sultan, and an immediately consequent 
exchange of letters between the prime ministers of Kenya and Zanzibar set out guarantees over 
Muslim education, worship and the jurisdiction of Muslim family law courts, as well as existing 
property rights, on the coast.
50
  The delay between Robertson’s report and the treaty was not a result 
of difficult negotiations with the Sultan – who had made clear his acceptance of Robertson’s 
recommendations in March 1962.
51
 It was rather that the issue of the Sultan’s sovereignty had become 
entirely overshadowed by another debate, which had swiftly changed patterns of racial and ethnic 
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alliance in ways which were to have long-term significance. This was the debate over regionalism, or 
majimbo.  
 
 Mwambao to Majimbo 
In October 1961 – even as Robertson was collecting evidence – KADU had been developing a new 
and distinctive policy, calling for Kenya to become independent with a constitution which would turn 
its former, centralized system of provinces into ‘regions’ with  significant devolved powers.  There is 
continued debate over the extent to which this policy may have been encouraged by white settlers, 
who saw it as a possible way to entrench their privileged position; whatever the origin of the policy, 
regionalism was seized upon by Ngala and other KADU leaders as a policy which answered their 
anxieties over domination by Kikuyu and Luo – the two ethnic groups which mainly supported 
KANU.
52
 In some of the submissions to Robertson, the idea of regionalism was making its first, 
uncertain appearance, and some struggled to distinguish this idea from that of secession: pressed in 
one meeting over apparent inconsistency, one advocate of regionalism had to admit that ‘they had not 
worked out details as yet’.53 By the end of 1961, the brief alliance which had allowed KANU and 
KADU supporters on the coast to cooperate in rejecting mwambao had been forgotten; for the next 
three years, regionalism was the key issue, and in this case the debate concerned the Coast Province 
as a whole, rather than the Ten-Mile Strip. Regionalism set coastal people as a whole against those 
from up-country; in this time of multiple, ephemeral parties, a Coast People’s United Front came into 
brief existence, claiming to unite a constituency of Arabs, Asians and Mijikenda.
54
  The most extreme 
supporters of regionalism made sweeping demands: 
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We do not want any Wakamba, Luos and Kikuyus to take any responsible [sic] in our 
District, they should be under our responsible in this Region, or to be removed away from our 
reserves and back to their own regions.
55
 
 CAPU, which in 1961 had opposed mwambao, was by 1962 demanding ‘complete autonomy’ and 
‘independence’ for the coast within a year, and the ‘repatriation’ of ‘up-country’ civil servants.56  
Regionalism had a brief triumph in 1962,  when in the negotiations over Kenyan independence, 
KANU reluctantly agreed to KADU’s demand that Kenya would move to self-government under a 
regionalist constitution.  This was a popular policy on the coast, and in the elections of 1963 KADU 
won 9 of the 12 coastal seats in the national parliament (with almost two-thirds of the votes cast), and 
21 of the 30 seats in the Coast Regional Assembly.
57
 But this was a hollow victory, for overall the 
national parliament was dominated by KANU, whose leaders had made clear both their preference for 
a centralized independent state, and  their intention to abolish regionalism as soon as possible.
58
 Even 
before formal independence in December 1963 KANU had begun to systematically undermine the 
regional governments, and during 1964 there was a steady stream of defections from KADU to 
KANU.
59
  Ngala, who had been elected as leader of the Coast Assembly and as a national MP, was 
the last to admit defeat; in November 1964, having been abandoned by all the other KADU leaders, 
he crossed the floor to join the ruling party .60 Within two months a new constitution had been passed, 
abolishing the regions and reintroducing the centralized administrative state that had been established 
by colonialism. 
For many at the coast, emboldened by Ngala’s vivid promises to defend regionalism to the end, the 
dissolution of KADU and of the regional government was a bitter moment.
61
  Regionalism had 
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commanded support from disappointed supporters of mwambao, as well as their former opponents; 
from those who defined themselves as Arabs and from those whose collective sense of themselves as 
Mijikenda had been developed by the vivid politics of late 1961. The demise of KADU left no space 
for a formal politics of coastal identity; somewhat ironically, some coastal militants joined the Kenya 
People’s Union (KPU) in 1966 as a means to articulate their opposition, although the KPU was far 
from regionalist in its policies.
62
 Writing a history of the coast in the early 1970s, Salim carefully 
distanced himself (and the population generally) from any idea of separatism, avowing instead 
‘optimism and enthusiasm for participation in nation-building’.63  But a sense of grievance persisted, 
exacerbated by the continuing tensions over land. These could still be framed as a conflict between 
Arabs and Africans, but the steady transfer into up-country African hands of a significant proportion 
of coastal land, and the predominance of ‘up-country’ people in civil service and parastatal jobs, 
meant that ethnicity was a steadily more important fault-line. A factional local electoral politics – in 
Mombasa, especially – revolved around these two cross-cutting tensions, with rival leaders mobilizing 
constantly shifting alliances which sometimes linked Arabs and coastal Africans against ‘up-country’ 
Africans, and sometimes pitted Arabs against Africans.
 64
  
From the 1990s, the return of multi-party politics created new space for the public articulation of 
these grievances, in the context of the institutional weakness, diffusion of violence and the rise of a 
party-politics driven by ethnic clientilism which Susanne Mueller has identified as the key elements in 
the development of an increasingly febrile political climate across Kenya.
65
 Local figures in KANU at 
the coast instrumentalized coastal grievances in the 1992 and 1997 elections, seeking to drive out 
Kikuyu and Luo residents who might vote for the opposition – for the ethnic alignments of party 
politics had been ironically reversed, and now KANU was in the hands of Moi, Ngala’s erstwhile ally 
and Kenya’s most accomplished political survivor.  Brief but locally savage spasms of violence were 
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preceded by campaigns of whispering and threatening leaflets aimed at ‘up-country’ people.66 The 
generalized sense of coastal grievance overlapped uncertainly with a sense of exclusion which was 
specific to Muslims – the ‘Islamic Party of Kenya’, which flourished briefly in the 1990s, while cast 
as a movement of ‘Islamic extremism’, was a largely coastal movement which picked up on the wider 
themes of economic and educational marginalization, and the alleged extraction of wealth by up-
country people.
67
 A succession of minor, legal, parties drew on this feeling, though none were bold 
enough to publicly advocate secession.
68
  But the political context was changed again by the very 
active and vigorous debate on a new constitution which followed the 2002 election, which gained in 
intensity as a result of the 2005 referendum. This effectively created a ‘critical juncture’ in Kenyan 
politics more widely; new political possibilities suddenly opened out, authorizing public debate over 
the fundamentals of Kenya’s future in a way which had not been possible since the early 1960s.69  
The many voices of the MRC 
At the beginning of 2005 a new organization announced its appearance at the Kenya coast. The 
‘Republican Council’ addressed a letter to the Queen Elizabeth II which set out, at considerable 
length, the multiple grievances of coastal people. The list was familiar enough: poor education 
provision, the domination of up-country people in public sector jobs, the ‘grabbing of huge chunks of 
Coastal land’ by Kenyatta and others. The letter revived the treaty-based claims making of 
mwambaoism: it denounced the agreements of 1963 and of 1895; invoking instead the Zanzibar 
protectorate agreement of 1890 which it claimed (inaccurately, on numerous grounds): 
 
provides a road map and a whole sale politico-administrative package under which the Kenya 
Colony colonized by the British Governors and the Coastal Protectorate (also known as 
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Kenya Protectorate) colonized by the Arabs under Arab sultans were to be two independent 
territorial entities with definite territorial boundaries, full and equal constitutional rights.
70
 
 
The letter asserted that since the 2004 ‘Bomas draft’ of a new Kenyan constitution - which would 
have addressed coastal grievances – had been sabotaged by the ‘land grabbers’ then ‘we the Coast 
Protectorate Natives denounce the citizenship of Kenya’ and that ‘the Coastal Protectorate, known as 
Mombasa, is declared a Republic of Mombasa from now – and is under the authority of the 
Republican Council’. The letter was signed by Omar Mwamnwadzi and twelve others, including H. 
R. Nzai. 
 
The text of the letter was circulated at the coast (and was still circulating in 2011). Its verbose and 
jumbled evocation of history, and the very idea of writing to the Queen, were an ambitious attempt to 
appropriate the authority of documentary knowledge and present a distinctive challenge to state 
legitimacy. The letter’s evocation of coastal identity was interestingly ambivalent. In one passage it 
offered a deep history of Arab settlement on the coast: 
 
The Coastal Strip initially had been a colony of the Ammu Zaid Arabs who made Benadir 
Coast their capital in 740 AD and ruled important towns of the East Coast of Africa for two 
hundred years (200 years), then a colony of the Arab Zenj Empire from Persia under Hassan 
Bin Ali in 975 AD and ruled the whole of the East Coast of Africa for five hundred years 
(500 years) then a colony of the Portuguese who came in the early fifteenth century and ruled 
the East Coast of Africa for nearly four hundred years (400 years). 
 
The letter’s use of the term ‘coastals’, and the denunciation of ‘the black colonialism of Kenya against 
the entire Coastal Protectorate (the Republic of Mombasa)’ suggested a racially inclusive vision of 
coast identity which embraced Arabs and Asians as well as Africans and which used the sultan’s 
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former sovereignty over the coast as the basis for a claim to independence, just as mwambao 
supporters  had done in the early 1960s. But elsewhere the letter implied that the Mijikenda were the 
rightful population of the coast:  ‘That’s why until today the government of Kenya works hard to 
ensure that the Mijikenda remain economically poor so that they cannot one day rise against the ills of 
the Central Kenya government.’ 
 
Soon after this letter was written, the police raided what they said was a camp where young men were 
swearing oaths to commit violence and undergoing military training; several people were killed and a 
number arrested, including Mwamnwadzi. 
71
 H. R. Nzai, or Randu Nzai Ruwa as he came to be more 
usually styled, became the most prominent, if occasional spokesman for the group. In 2010, in the 
run-up to the referendum on a new draft constitution, new documents - now using the name 
Republican Council of Mombasa – began to circulate. One letter, signed by Randu Nzai, was 
addressed to all coastal members of parliament: 
 
The Republican Council of Mombasa (RECOMO) is kindly calling for your support to save 
the Coastal natives from the Government of Kenya . . . either through peace or bloodshed 
Coast will one day be a country of its own.
72
 
A further letter was sent to the Queen, and another to the East African Parliament.
73
 The Republican 
Council also produced a manifesto in 2010, which identified the people of the coast as including 
Mijikenda, Arabs and Asians, and evoked the treaties of 1895 and 1963 and the Robertson 
commission report in a claim to independence whose breathless style and aberrant punctuation blurred 
detail while asserting knowledge: 
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 . . .the British government and the government of Zanzibar placed the Coast region under the 
protection of the government of Kenya. Agreement No cmnd 2161 which on its paragraph 
four (4) third and fourth lines stated that the government of Kenya, entered into certain 
undertaking concerning the protection after Kenya has attained independence. 
Some of the reasons that made this Coast Region be placed under Kenya’s protection was 
well illustrated in the colony and protectorate of Kenya sessional paper No 9 of 1961 in 
chapter ‘V examination of proposed solutions Section (a) clause 50 line 15 stating. A number 
of people said that they wanted the British to maintain their connexion with the coastal strip 
and indeed looked to her Majesty’s government to defend them against possible invasion 
from upcountry Kenya tribes people. If the strip was set up as an autonomous state. The 
letters written by M. Shamte and J. Kenyatta concluded in London 5
th
 October 1963 and 
exchanged to each other. Now under the Mombasa Republican council we can administer 
ourselves. Therefore the Republic of Kenya is being urged by the Mombasa republican 
Council to nullify the 8/10/1963 Agreement. 
74
 
 
Randu Nzai took up other issues on which local feeling ran deep. Early in 2011, he and two others 
brought a civil case to the High Court to try and stop the privatization of some functions of the Port of 
Mombasa, widely suspected of benefitting well-connected individuals from ‘up-country’; the case 
lapsed when the privatization process was suspended for other reasons, but it provided another 
opportunity to produce and circulate documents.
75
 By early 2011, more letters were circulating, like 
that of 2005, evoking history in support of claims to independence in the name of what was now 
called the Mombasa Republican Council; in late 2011, the eviction of squatters provided an 
opportunity for the MRC to publicly restate the urgency of addressing the multiple historical 
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injustices meted against the coast people, particularly  over land.76 A letter sent to the 
International Court of Justice by a Ugandan solicitor working for the MRC – copies of which were, 
again, circulated at the coast - declared that: 
Before Britain granted independence to the Kenya Colony and Protectorate the British 
government did place Coastal strip under Kenya Government for security reasons and 
protection for a period up to when the Coastal strip was ready to take up its mantle as an 
autonomous state. There was no agreement whatsoever that the Coastal Strip was to form part 
of Kenya.
77
 
While hostile critics persistently allege that the MRC was a radical Muslim organization linked to al-
Shabaab, support has by no means been confined to Muslims.
78
 In mid-2011 a meeting of ‘[t]he 
Pwani Church, which is a confederation of Christian churches of indigenous coastal peoples’ asserted 
its support for the Mombasa Republican Council as a ‘spontaneous coastal people response to the 
long-standing grievances of the coastal people against the government of Kenya and . . . up-country 
immigrants communities’. 79 
Alongside these circulating documents, and taking up and amplifying their themes, people continued 
to elaborate through speech – sometimes to crowds, sometimes in everyday conversation - their 
claims to an alternative knowledge of the treaties of the 1890s and 1960s. Confusion over the content 
of these documents has multiplied: the only extended study of the MRC, while in many ways a 
reflective and thoughtful piece of work, reproduces multiple factual inaccuracies.
80
 One common 
assertion is that the agreements enshrined coastal autonomy, since the treaty uniting the coast with 
                                               
76
 Bozo Jenje, George Kikami and Jonathan Manyindo, ‘Banned group urges squatters to resist eviction from 
ancestral land’, Daily Nation, 13 December 2011 <http://allafrica.com/stories/201112140075.html> 29 
August 2012. 
77
 Ambrose Tebyasa to Chief Registrar, International Court of Justice, 2 November 2010 (copy circulating in 
Kaloleni, January 2011) 
78
 For the al-Shabaab allegation see for example James Macharia, ‘Separatist storm brewing on Kenya’s coast’, 
Reuters, 23 July 2012: at http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/07/23/uk-kenya-coast-mrc-
idUKBRE86M0H820120723  
79
 ‘Statement on the Mombasa Republican Council’, Bishop James Mungumi and Bishop Stephen Mkomu and 
31 signatories,  nd 2010 (document supplied by Randu Nzai, November 2011). 
80
 Paul Goldsmith, ‘The Mombasa Republican Council. Conflict Assessment: Threats and Opportunities for 
Engagement’, November 2011.  
  
Kenya was to be valid only for fifty years. At  a public meeting in October 2011 a speaker announced 
that ‘documents in the organisation’s possession indicated that by 2013 the government of Kenya 
should return the region to its indigenous people after the expiry of a 50-year “lease” agreement 
signed on October 5 1963’; and in January 2012 a man who claimed to be the chairman of the MRC 
‘branch’ in Likoni demanded rhetorically in a press conference ‘”Why does Kenya fail to honor its 
contract with Pwani which was signed in 1963?”’.81 In 2010,  an interviewee insisted   ‘that treaty 
ended after 50 years, it ended, now I want my part, as a Digo, a Mijikenda. The Sultan, and the 
English, and Kenyatta, all agreed and signed.’82 A prominent Mijikenda Muslim leader made a similar 
claim in 2009 – though he presented the treaty as one which specifically concerned Muslims.83  
Written documents and the MRC’s Facebook site echo these circulating arguments, though often 
elliptically, spreading and affirming slightly variant forms of this alternative knowledge; multiple 
individuals who claim to speak for the organization give press statements articulating slightly 
differing versions. A leaflet circulated in the name of the MRC in 2011 explained that: ‘We are 
mobilizing the community who do not know the truth about the treaty which produced the union and 
the conditions which covered the completion of the agreement for the union’.84 Facebook posts 
similarly assert that the Kenya government has in some way failed to meet the terms of the 1963 
agreements, and so these are now void. ‘[T]he rule of Kenya here on our coast is not how we agreed it 
should be in our treaty’, declared one post; while another stated: 
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… we have a treaty with Kenya, if all that we agreed is not fulfilled then there is justice for a 
broken treaty, we agreed with Kenya that the administration from the highest rank to the 
bottom should be our fellow coast people.
85
  
Yet another post offered a rather disingenuously-presented extract from Robertson’s 
recommendations: ‘The coastal strip should be integrated administratively with Kenya before self-
government and independence takes place’. Robertson had meant this to refer to Kenyan 
independence, but quoted thus the extract might be taken to mean coastal independence: ‘so, folks, 
this is clear, what can those who are opposed to us say now?’, asked the post, rhetorically.86 More 
plaintively, another post on the site asked: ‘when the treaty with Kenya ends will there be a new treaty 
or will the coast be a country by itself’?87  
Coastal politicians, who have established themselves in Kenya’s patrimonial national politics as 
intermediaries between the region and the centre, have struggled to manage the challenge of the 
MRC. They are mostly reluctant to denounce a movement which has apparently captured much public 
sympathy; but secession would remove the need for intermediacy on which their positions rely.  By 
early 2012, a number of them were hesitantly moving to express their sympathy for the MRC, while 
avoiding any direct endorsement of its secessionist agenda.
88
 Meanwhile the self-proclaimed leaders 
of the MRC themselves continue to generate uncertainty over the precise nature of their agenda, 
distancing themselves from leaflets threatening violence against ‘up-country’ people, and announcing 
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that the movement is peaceful and a ‘social’ one – but also insisting on independence, and in some 
cases threatening to enforce an electoral boycott by violence.
89
  
Behind these uncertainties looms a larger one, for the old division within ‘coastal’ opinion is still 
apparent – though some argue that the MRC has united coastal people.90 Those who say they speak 
for the MRC have started to use the Swahili term wapwani, ‘coast people’, to define their 
constituency; English translations of this have included ‘coastarians’. But who are the wapwani? The 
distinction between ‘Arab’ and ‘African’ is still readily evoked in coastal politics: Mijikenda 
(including many Muslim Mijikenda) denounce the alleged social and economic privileges of those 
they call Arabs; and while those who call themselves Arabs or Swahili are more reluctant to use racial 
language publicly, some will talk privately of Africans with a condescension which borders on 
contempt.
91
 Those who claim to speak on behalf of, or in support of, the MRC deploy different 
representations of history in arguing the case for coastal secession, which offer very different ideas of 
where rightful authority over the coast lies, and what it is to be ‘coastal’. The written style and 
uploaded images on the MRC Facebook page suggest that it is  the work of young urbanites; when 
Chirau Mwakwere, currently the most prominent coastal politician, chided the MRC for being too 
focused on Mombasa, he was asserting the importance of what he called the ‘indigenous’ Mijikenda 
constituency, implying a claim to the coast based on autochthony, not on ingenious re-readings of 
historic treaties; the decision to use the word Mombasa in the MRC’s title (the logic of which is not 
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clear) has attracted wider unfavourable comment.
92
  One of the documents circulating in the name of 
the MRC asserts that the organization represents ‘the original people of the coastal mwambao which 
was under British protection’, and ‘a collection of Mijikenda, Taita-Taveta, Pokomo Bajuni’: a list 
which pointedly excludes Arabs and Swahili.
93
 This contrasts with the more expansive definition 
offered by the MRC manifesto: 
The country, Mombasa which extends right from the Indian Ocean to Sultan Hamud, from 
Lungalunga to Kismayu [is] owned by natives, namely; the Mijikendas, Taitas, Pokomos, 
Bajunis, Arabs, Hindus and other Coastal tribes.
94
 
Postings on the MRC Facebook page similarly insist that the movement is inclusive: ‘here on the 
coast there are people of different classes, tribes and religions, and we coast people know one another; 
there are black coast people and white coast people.’ 95 The iconography of the movement has also 
sought inclusivity, incorporating the symbols once used by both  the pro-mwambao CPP and by anti-
mwambao  CAPU; the Facebook site carries multiple images of Mombasa’s Old Town, evoking an 
urban, multi-racial ideal of a coastal identity which is cosmopolitan and at ease with technology.  
But clearly not all agree. And some oral histories circulating on the coast outside Mombasa, in 
particular, rework the events of the early 1960s to offer a different argument.  Descriptions of the 
intention and the outcome of the delegation to the Sultan in 1961 turn this from an ephemeral moment 
of political theatre into a definitional episode. The elders, in these accounts, went not to denounce the 
Sultan’s claim to sovereignty, but to ask that the coast be given to them, as representatives of the 
Mijikenda. Sometimes this is explicitly framed as a riposte to ‘Arab’ claims – as it was in the 1960s – 
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but now it is also presented as a rejection of the claims of the Kenyan state: as one man put it, the 
delegation went because ‘we are not Kenyans’.96 The delegation is presented as a mission which 
asserted indigenous rights against the claims of the Sultan and those of Kenya: ‘[Matano] went to 
Zanzibar with his committee to fight for the Coast province, you see – they had gone to demand 
Mwambao for the coast, we wanted to fight for it so we may rule ourselves’.97 ‘These people went to 
Zanzibar with Ronald Ngala . . . to look for our independence, a coastal region . . . they were looking 
for the coast, for the indigenous coastal people’.98 
 Layers of detail are added, suggesting that the delegation were presented with a letter attesting to 
‘Mijikenda’ ownership of the coast, and thus locating the delegation as part of the complex chain of 
negotiations over independence and the trail of documents which these spawned: 
. . . they went to Zanzibar with Ngala . . . he went with the elders and sat with the Sultan, they 
talked many times, coming and going, you know, when you go to negotiations it doesn’t take 
only one time, they came and went, they came and went, until in the end, it was necessary, I 
think the Queen intervened, the British government intervened, when it intervened then the 
Sultan and the Mijikenda elders had to make a plan for the independence of the coast, the 
Sultan would leave and the coast would be independent.
99
 
The suggestion that the delegation to the coast had produced a document of Mijikenda ‘ownership’ 
may not be entirely a novelty. One interviewee explained that Matano himself had claimed to be in 
possession of this document in the 1970s, in an early attempt to appropriate the mysterious power of 
paper:  
[Matano said] “Ngala sent me and the elders . . . I took the elders to Zanzibar, we went and 
saw the Sultan and said we have come as the Mijikenda Union, these elders of the nine tribes 
to ask you, the Sultan of Zanzibar, does the coast belong to the Arabs or to the Mijikenda”, he 
said the Sultan said that the coast belongs to the Mijikenda . . . he said, “we told him he 
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should write a certificate to show that the coast does not belong to the Arabs but to the 
Mijikenda”, and Matano said, “Even now I have a copy of that document, because when we 
were given it I sent one copy to the Governor and kept one”100 
These variant versions of the story of the delegation are very much a story of Mijikenda claims; and 
its circulation as an oral history, rather than a Facebook post, suggests the divided nature of the 
MRC’s support, and the profoundly different ideas of legitimacy which underlie ideas about 
secession. 
Conclusion 
There are multiple misrepresentations and ironies in these retellings of coastal history: treaties are said 
to contain provisions which do not exist, a delegation which sought assurances against secession is 
recast as a mission to secure it. As Lotte Hughes has shown of Maasai claims, attempts to redress 
perceived historical injustice can involve considerable historical inventions.
101
  And the use of 
documents by the MRC, like the Maasai evocation of colonial treaties or the appeal to the French 
government made by Casamance separatists, might seem a dangerous strategy: anyone with an 
internet connection can find the text of the 1963 agreement, and see that there is no reference in it to 
coastal independence or a 50-year limit – indeed, the document is now available on the MRC’s own 
Facebook site.
102
 But it is important to remember that there are multiple levels of misrepresentation in 
this story: the MRC’s fictions are the long-term consequence of the Sultan’s claims to sovereignty 
over people of whom he knew little, whose acknowledgement of his authority was cursory at best; of 
the semi-coerced treaties which he signed in the 1890s; and of the pantomime inquiry undertaken by 
Robertson. The evident power of current inventions is the consequence of a profound sense of 
injustice consequent on those earlier misrepresentations. These retellings of the past are evidence of 
the plasticity of memory, but even more they are the consequence of people’s exclusion from 
powerful knowledge. While the constitutional debate of the last few years has given some people a 
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first experience of the possibility that official documents can be understood, and even mastered, most 
people’s experience, for most of their lives, has been disempowering.  The story of the MRC’s 
success is in part a story of the peculiar vulnerability of arcane knowledge to subversive 
reinterpretation; it shows how the layered paper legitimacy of the colonial and post-colonial state can 
be challenged by interpretations whose popular appeal does not require them to obey the logic of that 
legitimacy. For people who do not expect documents to make sense, they can be made to mean 
anything.    
Yet the support for secession is profoundly fractured, for its logic hangs between an avowedly multi-
ethnic vision – which uses historical treaties to avoid any discussion of the idea of autochthony – and 
an alternative idea of the coast as the ethnic domain of the Mijikenda. Evocations of a multi-racial 
independent nation based on the Sultan’s sovereignty may appeal to some; but for many Mijikenda, 
the claim to independence is a claim to ancestral land. While the supporters of the MRC may find it 
easy enough to agree that ‘Pwani C Kenya’, deciding who the real Wapwani are  is likely to be be 
more challenging. 
 
